Summary of State v. Ruscetta, Nev. Adv. Op. No. 32 by Hernandez, Krystallin
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries Law Journals
8-2-2007
Summary of State v. Ruscetta, Nev. Adv. Op. No. 32
Krystallin Hernandez
Nevada Law Journal
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Criminal Procedure Commons
This Case Summary is brought to you by Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law
Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hernandez, Krystallin, "Summary of State v. Ruscetta, Nev. Adv. Op. No. 32" (2007). Nevada Supreme Court Summaries. Paper 484.
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/484
State v. Ruscetta, Nev. Adv. Op. No. 32 (August 2, 2007)1 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – SCOPE OF CONSENSUAL VEHICLE SEARCH  
 
 
Summary 
 
Appeal from a district court’s order granting a defendant’s motion to suppress evidence 
found by a Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Officer during a consensual vehicle search.  
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
The Nevada Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order and remanded for additional 
proceedings. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Officers conducted a vehicle stop after observing David 
John Ruscetta make an illegal right turn.  A records check revealed Ruscetta was driving 
on a suspended license, and Ruscetta had two outstanding warrants for his arrest.  An 
officer asked Ruscetta to exit his vehicle.  Ruscetta complied and consented to a person 
search. 
 
Ruscetta also consented to a vehicle search.  Upon entering the vehicle, an officer 
observed someone had previously removed the air conditioning vents, the ashtray, and 
the center console.  The officer also observed an odor he recognized as marijuana.  When 
the officer placed his hand on the center console, the console shifted away from him, 
revealing three plastic baggies containing marijuana and a handgun.   
 
The officers arrested Ruscetta and transported him to the Clark County Detention Center 
for booking.  The officers conducted a vehicle inventory and impounded the vehicle. 
 
The State charged Ruscetta with possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell, 
unlawful possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm by an ex-felon.  Ruscetta 
waived his right to a preliminary hearing, and filed a motion to suppress the evidence 
found during the vehicle search.  At the hearing on the motion to suppress, the parties 
submitted the police report as the only evidence.  The district court found, the officer’s 
movement of the center console went beyond the scope of Ruscetta’s consent, based on 
the totality of the circumstances.  The district court granted Ruscetta’s oral motion for 
dismissal based on lack of evidence.  This appeal followed.  
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Discussion 
 
Scope of Consensual Vehicular Searches 
 
In Nevada, the scope of consensual vehicular searches is governed by the Supreme Court 
Opinion, Florida v. Jimeno,2 and the Nevada Opinion, State v. Johnson.3  The Fourth 
Amendment presumes every warrantless search and seizure unreasonable.4  Nonetheless, 
“waiver and consent, freely and intelligently given, converts a search and seizure which 
otherwise would be unlawful into a lawful search and seizure.”5  In Jimeno, the Supreme 
Court explains, “[t]he standard for measuring the scope of a suspect’s consent under the 
Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness—what would the typical 
reasonable person have understood by the exchange between the officer and the 
suspect?”6  Therefore, “[t]he Fourth Amendment is satisfied when, under the 
circumstances, it is objectively reasonable for the officer to believe that the scope of the 
suspect’s consent permitted him [to perform the action in question].”7 
 
Nevada considers dismantling a vehicle during a consensual search as lawful if, based on 
the totality of the circumstances,8 it is objectively reasonable to construe the vehicle’s 
dismantling as within the scope of consent.9  In Johnson, the Court considered 
“[i]nnocent citizens must not be stopped on the pretext of a traffic violation and have 
their automobiles dismantled when a police officer has nothing more than a ‘hunch’ that 
contraband may be present.”10  However, an inquiry is required as to “whether it is 
objectively reasonable to construe the consent to search the vehicle … to include consent 
to dismantle the vehicle.”11 
 
Here, the district court concluded that, based on the totality of the circumstances, the 
movement of the center console went beyond Ruscetta’s scope of consent.  However, the 
district court did not provide sufficient findings of fact enabling its decision to withstand 
appellate review. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 500 U.S. 248 (1991). 
3 116 Nev. 78, 993 P.2d 44 (2000). 
4 Herman v. State, 122 Nev. 199, 204, 128 P.3d 469, 472 (2006). 
5 Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991). 
6 Id. at 251. 
7 Id. at 249. 
8 Relevant considerations with respect to the scope of consent include “any express or implied limitations 
regarding the time, duration, area, or intensity of police activity necessary to accomplish the stated purpose 
of the search, as well as the expressed object of the search.”  State v. Troxell, 78 S.W.3d 866, 871 (Tenn. 
2002). 
9 Johnson, 116 Nev. 78. 
10 Id. at 81. 
11 Id. at 82, 993 P.2d at 46 (Agosti, J., concurring) (construing Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248). 
 
Insufficient Findings to Withstand Review 
 
The district court failed to hold an evidentiary hearing, failed to examine witnesses, and 
failed to make any written findings regarding the officer’s conduct during the search.    
The Court has repeatedly “advised district courts to issue express factual findings when 
ruling on suppression motions so that this court [does] not have to speculate as to what 
findings were made below.”12  Therefore, because the record did not sufficiently provide 
the Court with information necessary for review, the Court vacated the district court’s 
order granting Ruscetta’s motion to supress. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Though the district court correctly considered the scope of a consensual vehicle search 
limited to what an objectively reasonable officer would believe within the scope of 
consent, based on the totality of the circumstances, the court failed to make findings of 
fact sufficient to withstand review.  Therefore, the Nevada Supreme Court vacated the 
district court’s order and remanded for additional proceedings.    
                                                 
12 State v. Rincon, 122 Nev. ___, ___, 147 P.3d 233, 237 (2006). 
